Islamic civilisations flourished in the Middle East and North Africa, so why did the region fall behind economically?
Political economists generally emphasise institutions. Jared Rubin, Faisal Ahmed, Ahmet Kuru all underscore religious authoritarianism. Caliphs empowered the ulama, who then preached obedience to the caliph. Timur Kuran in turn blames ‘waqfs’ - Islamic endowment trusts, another kind of institution.
This explanation seems a little unconvincing. East Asian rulers were also authoritarian, Confucian texts prescribed obedience to the emperor, and yet they have experienced rapid economic development. Confucian cultural values were neither a long-run impediment to economic growth nor democratisation. South Korea is just as rich and democratic as the UK.
What about geography?
J.R. McNeil, an Environmental Historian, highlights MENA’s distinctive geography. For starters, it suffered from dearth of arable land. 90% of MENA is unsuitable for either forest or rain-fed agriculture. Since soils in Syria, Tunisia, Iran, and Anatolia were generally marginal, a 20 percent drop in rainfall could be totally disastrous.
My photos below provide a few illustrative examples of semi-arid soils in Mardin and the Atlas Mountains.
MENA’s distinctive patchwork of pastoralists and farmers
The Middle East and North Africa was historically home to herders. McNeil details that in the 1520s, a quarter of the inhabitants of Anatolia, and as much as 60% of those living in Ottoman Arab provinces, were nomads or semi-nomads. From Morocco to Balochistan, grasslands interweave through arable lands, creating a patchwork quilt, with small pockets of riverine settlements. Compared to any other world region, there would have been far more interactions between pastoralists and farmers.
Frequent interactions between pastoralists and farmers may have shaped gene-culture evolution - such as lactose intolerance. Between five to nine thousand years ago, a genetic mutation occurred, creating lactose tolerant adults. This likely spread rapidly among populations with ready access to cattle, goats, and camels. MENA’s people - most especially the Bedouins - have extremely high rates of lactose tolerance.
Cooperation could be mutually advantageous - pastoralists and farmers harnessed transport routes and pack animals to benefit from trade. McNeil suggests these synergies may have contributed to early commercial development.
If dissatisfied with the terms of trade, pastoralists could turn to violence. Turkic archers on horse-back were formidable foes, raiding farming villages, slaughtering and pillaging, while their own women, children, and herds remained safe. Much like sea pirates, they could hit and run, escape to the hinterland.
Chinese and Indian farmers were also attacked by nomads, but only at edges of their vast agrarian economies. In East Asia, from the Qin Unification (221 BCE), large agrarian empires emerged in response to raids by pastoralist confederacies - argues McNeil, citing Peter Turchin. Globally, big agrarian empires tended to emerge where arable and grasslands met. MENA was different, it comprised a vast patchwork of interwoven pastoralists and herders.
Curiously, McNeil does not connect MENA’s two distinctive geographical features. Let me suggest a synthesis: MENA’s settlements constantly suffered nomad attacks, yet lacked the agrarian surplus to build up defences. So instead of a singular “Great Wall of China”, the Middle East and North Africa have an abundance of Walled Cities - like Fes and Rabat.
Starvation and rebellion
The Little Ice Age severely hit the Ottoman Empire; the late 16th century heralded freezing cold winters, prolonged drought and widespread starvation. Large parts of the empire were depopulated by famine, flight, and violence. In the 1590s, the capital ran short of basic supplies, especially wheat and sheep. To feed the troops, sultan Mehmed II ramped up demands, requisitioning 200,000 sheep. But subjects were already pushed to the brink. Bandits, rebel tribes and unemployed madrasa students then organised an uprising - the Celali Rebellion.
While this revolt was defeated, depopulation persisted. Ottoman tax records suggest that half of the provinces in Anatolia saw their numbers decline. Pastoralists were also struggling, and in the early 1600s they invaded farmlands en masse. The imperial government were unable to quell this encroachment.
“In little more than a decade, nearly a century of settlement expansion had come undone” - Sam White (Political Historian)
From the 1690s, the Ottomans sought to settle nomads and encourage farming, in order to raise taxes and increase conscription. Yet, for two centuries, many pastoral tribes successful resisted. McNeil does not say, but if farming was marginal, pastoral nomads may have been reluctant to give up their freedoms. It’s only relatively recently that Kurdish people have migrated to Turkish cities, and that’s primarily due to military incursions.
What about Central Asia?
Now, I am not an environmental historian, so perhaps this next remark is unqualified, but I’m unclear why McNeil repeatedly demarcates ‘the Middle East and North Africa’. Everything he says is perfectly true of Central Asia. Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan comprise motley patchworks of herders and farmers, often living on marginal lands, and experienced similar patterns of nomad incursions.
When I took an eleven hour train from Fergana Valley to Samarkand, I passed through vast expanses of semi-arid, uncultivable land. ‘MENA’ may be a helpful concept for geopolitics, but if we’re talking about geography, then I’d draw similarities with Central Asia.
How does insecurity affect culture?
In “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”, Adam Smith suggested that duelling is more common in societies where individuals lack confidence courts to provide justice and protect their honour. In early 17th century London, Glasgow and Edinburgh, men retaliated at the slightest infraction, a jostle in the street could prompt a duel. Thuggish reputations were individually rational, they kept men safe. But as rule of law improved, duelling declined.
Historically, the US South also had a ‘culture of honour’. Scots-Irish settlers became herders on marginal lands, where their assets remained insecure. If the state won’t help, what do you do to protect your assets? Get a gun, and make sure people believe you’ll pull the trigger.
Fast-forward to 21st century Karachi and criminality remains rampant. In the past two years, robbers have killed over 250 people. Without state protection, men are always on guard and learn to act tough. Pakistani mothers may even encourage their sons’ displays of violent strength.
Quantitative, cross-cultural research comes to a similar conclusion. Yiming Cao and colleagues find that herders’ descendents tend to emphasise punishment and vengeance in their folklore. They also have more more armed conflicts.
Now let me bring this altogether.
The Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia are geographically unusual. Soils were mostly semi-arid, unsuitable for agriculture. Farmers tended to live in scattered oases, or isolated riverine settlements, interspersed with pastoralists. This tapestry of peoples lived side by side, sometimes in cooperation, but often erupting into violent conflict. This unique combination of agricultural scarcity and nomad proximity made it much harder for states to accumulate taxation revenue and ensure basic security. Cities were walled, townspeople were always at risk of attack.
‘Bad geography’ (not just religious authoritarianism) may help explain why the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia fell behind economically.
Weak states and and pervasive insecurity may have also encouraged a culture of honour. Substituting for weak states, mothers may have taught their sons to assert themselves and project strength, in order to prevent exploitation. Compared to Japanese, Europeans and Americans, Saudis and Lebanese score very highly for ‘self-assertion’. Bad geography meant they struggled to develop the institutions that Stephen Pinker regards as so fundamental for the decline of violent cultures.
So while some like to contest the relative importance of geography, institutions, and culture, I suggest we trace their interconnections.
Further Reading:
