The World Bank has just published new data on 21st century progress and regional heterogeneity in gender equality.
The headline figures sound promising, but digging in more deeply, I suggest that equality has been obstructed by low state capacity, weak job-creation and entrenched authoritarianism.
(1) The gender gap in secondary school enrolment has now closed.
Caveat: “schooling ain’t learning”.
Educational quality (defined as literacy conditional on completing five years of schooling) has significantly declined in both South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
(2) Globally, females now exceed males in tertiary enrolment
This varies with culture. In MENA, men have more years of education.
(3) Adolescent fertility has plummeted
This is definitely a plus for women’s welfare.
It reflects rising education and improved access to contraception. Women are increasingly able to delay fertility and complete school. In some regions this reflects female desires for economic advancement, elsewhere it’s shaped by marriage markets.
(4) Over a quarter of girls in the middle of Africa are married before 18.
Fertility is also much higher among African Muslims (rather than Christians).
Phoebe Ishak argues this is entirely because African Muslim women typically marry younger, are less educated, less likely to work, and less able to achieve their preferences.
(5) Female employment remains low in South Asia and MENA, but has soared in Latin America and the Caribbean.
To understand this divergence, we must consider the social and economic opportunity costs of women remaining at home.
In MENA and South Asia, female paid work in the public sphere jeopardises men’s honour. Female seclusion enhances men’s social respectability and their place in vital kinship networks. In terms of culture, the opportunity cost of women remaining at home is actually low. Given weak job-creation, available earnings are paltry and women most remain at home.
But Latin America suggests that the stigma associated with women working outside the home is actually malleable: it wanes as societies become more urban, secular and individualistic. So although Latin America lacks good jobs, women still want to work.
The gender gap in employment is lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, though this should not be interpreted as gender equality. Given weak structural transformation, many African women are trapped in back-breaking agricultural labour on unproductive family farms. This is no kind of ‘empowerment’.
(6) Over 75% of firms are led by men.
Women are usually more likely to lead small firms. East Asia is globally exceptionally, approaching gender parity in small firm ownership.
In the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, over 85% of firms are led by men.
(7) Female share of parliamentary seats has risen
But this hasn’t necessarily enhanced women’s input in national governance. 64% of the world’s population lives under authoritarianism. Gender quotas have often been adopted to bolster international reputations and signal liberal tolerance.
Female legislative representatives may have little power to contest a dominant executive or achieve impactful policies if the state is generally ineffective.
It’s a classic example of what Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock condemn as isomorphic mimicry: a facade adopted to please an external audience with questionable substantive effects. Treat these numbers with caution.
(8) In poor, conflict-afflicted countries, over 50% of women have experienced intimate partner violence
Conflict is a major predictor of violence, as is poverty.
(9) Sexist laws persist in the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of South-East Asia
The World Bank does not mention religion, but Michèle Tertilt and colleagues show Islam is strongly associated with disparities in economic, political and bodily rights.
What’s the big takeaway?
Headline stats on gender sound promising, but these are slightly deceptive. Patriarchy persists in places with low state capacity, weak job-creation, and entrenched authoritarianism.
In poor countries with weak state capacity, literacy remains low. Greater parity in school enrolment sounds great, but may just be a holding pen, to delay child marriage.
MENA and South Asia are caught in what I call “The Patrilineal Trap”: available earnings are too low to compensate for men’s loss of honour and most women remain at home.
Rising female share of representation sounds like a win for equality, but this may not amount to much in places with autocrats and/or weak state capacity.
In places with persistent poverty and conflict, women are at high risk of violence.
Low development is not an insurmountable obstacle. Cultural liberalisation in Latin America has enabled greater female employment and activism.
The biggest problem with ‘Development’ is that there’s not enough.
Why does Figure 3 refer to births among "women aged 24-25"? That doesn't seem like adolescent fertility.
So is the argument from you that the change has been insignificant or that it's not enough?